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Electoral	officials	can	do	little	to	combat	information
which	undermines	elections
As	the	2020	presidential	election	approaches,	there	is	growing
concern	over	disinformation	about	the	electoral	process	which
may	work	to	undermine	the	legitimacy	of	the	election’s
outcome.	In	new	research,	Brian	Calfano,	Richard	Harknett,
Gregory	Winger,	and	Jelena	Vicic	surveyed	nearly	9,000
Americans	to	determine	the	effect	of	messaging	from
Secretaries	of	State	to	counter	disinformation.	They	find	that	attempts	to	correct	disinformation	by	Secretaries	of
State	about	elections	are	generally	ineffective,	regardless	of	whether	someone	is	a	Republican	or	Democratic	voter.
In	the	2020	election,	voting	procedures	have	become	a	breeding	ground	for	disinformation	that	targets	the	election
process.	The	goal	of	this	disinformation	is	not	merely	to	mislead	people,	but	to	use	election	controversies	to	erode
public	confidence	in	the	democratic	process	and	undermine	the	legitimacy	of	the	outcomes	it	produces.	In	order	to
counter	such	delegitimization	campaigns,	election	officials	like	Secretaries	of	State	(SoS)	must	actively	engage	in
proactive	campaigns	to	combat	electoral	disinformation.	In	new	research,	the	Center	for	Cyber	Strategy	and	Policy
at	University	of	Cincinnati	has	tested	whether	these	proactive	efforts	can	counter	delegitimization	attacks	and
successfully	buoy	popular	perceptions	of	election	procedures.
Although	crisis	communication	literature	stresses	the	importance	of	practices	like	proactive	engagement	and
transparency,	it	is	unclear	whether	such	methods	can	counter	disinformation	effects	when	the	target	audience	is
motivated	by	partisanship	and	ideology.	The	dilemma	election	officials	face	may	be	similar	to	the	backfire	effect	–
when	given	information	which	corrects	disinformation,	some	people	end	up	believing	the	original	false	information
even	more	strongly.	Such	corrective	efforts	(i.e.,	fact	checking)	may	be	ineffective	when	partisan	beliefs	power
perceptions	perhaps,	in	part,	because	government	engagement	with	the	disinformation	can	lend	credence	to
misleading	claims,	amplifying	its	message,	and/or	undercutting	truthful	sources.	By	engaging,	there	is	the	danger
that	SoS	and	other	legitimate	officials	have	their	corrective	messages	lost	in	the	information	soup—reinforcing	the
public’s	sense	that	electoral	security	is	generally	in	doubt.	
Testing	whether	campaigns	to	counter	disinformation	work
Our	evaluation	comes	from	a	survey-embedded	experiment	on	an	opt-in	national	sample	of	8,809	US	adults	fielded
between	October	3-5,	2020.	The	sample,	generated	by	the	firm	Lucid,	is	not	probability-based,	but	is	weighted	to
represent	the	general	public	along	racial,	gender,	and	age	demographics.
Our	experiment	randomly	assigned	subjects	to	one	of	seven	conditions.	The	first	group	was	a	pure	control
consisting	of	entertainment	and	non-political	stories	to	provide	a	baseline.	For	the	second	group,	we	included	news
stories	and	tweets	concerning	a	prominent	and	recurring	theory	that	absentee	ballots	can	be	submitted	for	dead
people.	To	the	third	and	fourth	groups,	we	presented	the	same	“voting	dead”	information,	but	with	counter-
messaging	provided	by	a	Secretary	of	State	(SofS).	office	and	modeled	on	existing	communications	from	current
election	officials	using	reassurance	or	transparency	messaging.	The	5th,	6th	and	7th	groups	were	presented	with	the
same	materials	as	were	groups	two	through	four,	but	we	replaced	the	generic	office	with	a	named	SofS.	Using	a
named	SoS	reflects	common	practice	in	most	US	States	and	added	a	series	of	stories	about	leaked	emails	from	the
SoS.	Figure	1	is	an	example	of	the	named	SoS	(fictitious)	from	the	sixth	group.
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The	random	assignments	we	made	were	not	correlated	to	any	of	the	subjects’	demographic	characteristics,
including	partisanship,	and	their	responses	to	open-ended	questions	show	that	those	we	surveyed	recalled	the
general	subject	matter	assigned	to	each	group.	Our	survey	questions	–	taken	from	a	series	of	publicly	released
polls	on	election	security	issues	(SSRS,	Pew,	Ipsos,	and	Gallup)	–	focused	on	measures	of	electoral	integrity,
looking	to	gauge	1)	overall	public	concern	about	election	security,	2)	the	ease	casting	of	fraudulent	ballots,	3)	the
frequency	of	voter	fraud,	4)	tampering	with	the	mail	during	the	election,	and	5)	fraud	in	vote-by-mail	options.	We
scaled	responses	to	these	outcome	questions	between	one	and	four,	with	higher	values	representing	greater
concern	about	the	election	or	voter	fraud	of	some	type	(Figure	2).
Figure	2
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Our	first	test	in	Figure	3	focuses	on	mean	differences	between	the	pure	control	groups	and	the	others.	As	you	can
see,	the	higher	Delegitimization	Index	Score	means	(which	are	statistically	different	from	the	pure	control)	are	from
those	surveyed	who	were	exposed	to	the	named	Secretary	of	State	(SoS)	—with	the	highest	index	score	from
those	exposed	only	to	the	named	experiencing	the	disinformation	attack.	But	the	differences	between	these	three
“named”	groups	are	not	statistically	distinguishable.	Meanwhile,	respondents	who	saw	the	non-named	SoS	score
almost	as	highly	as	the	named	versions,	but	these	are	not	significantly	different	from	the	pure	control	mean.
“Twitter	vote	button”	by	Gage	Skidmore	is	licensed	under	CC	BY	SA	2.0
Figure	3
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Figure	5
In	terms	of	partisanship	effects	across	self-identified	Trump	and	Biden	supporters	(including	“leaners”)	we	see	a
generally	similar	outcome—with	the	effects	almost	the	same	across	groups	who	were	given	the	disinformation
correction	(and	the	effects	on	those	who	were	given	this	information	by	the	named	SoS	were	significantly	different
compared	to	the	pure	control	for	Biden	voters).	Note,	however,	the	difference	in	Y	axis	values.	Trump	supporters
are	half	a	point	higher	in	their	Delegitimization	Index	scores	than	their	Biden	counterparts,	even	as	none	of	the
Trump	voters	in	the	groups	are	statistically	different.	In	other	words,	corrective	attempts	to	deal	with	disinformation
get	lost	irrespective	of	who	people	vote	for	(but	Trump	voters	have	higher	delegitimization	scores).
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The	regression	model	in	Figure	6	featuring	the	group	and	demographic	variables	shows	the	same	pattern	of	effects.
Figure	6	–	Delegitimization	Index	Scores
While	many	Secretary	of	State’s	(SofS)	offices	push	back	against	electoral	disinformation,	these	efforts	may	fail.	To
some	extent,	SoS	interventions	in	our	experiment	made	the	situation	worse,	raising	fraud	concern	scores
regardless	of	vote	choice.	This	speaks	to	the	inherent	difficulty	government	leaders	face	in	correcting	disinformation
and	the	underlying	challenges	democratic	societies	must	address	in	the	face	of	delegitimization	campaigns.
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